SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HYPOTHESIS)

THOMAS KUHN 

He explains a scientific revolution as a radical shift in how a scientific community understands and investigates the world. In his landmark book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), he contrasts "normal science" with "revolutionary science". IT TAKES FOUR STEPS.  

 1. Normal Science Most of the time, scientists work within a paradigm: a shared framework of theories, methods, and assumptions that defines legitimate problems and acceptable solutions. Normal science is puzzle-solving—scientists refine theories, run experiments, and accumulate knowledge, but always within the accepted paradigm. 

 2. Crisis Over time, anomalies—observations or problems the paradigm cannot explain—accumulate. If these anomalies persist and become too severe, they trigger a crisis of confidence in the existing framework. 

 3. Scientific Revolution A new paradigm emerges that explains both the old data and the anomalies more effectively. This change is not gradual but discontinuous and radical: the scientific community abandons the old worldview in favor of a new one. Examples: the Copernican revolution (heliocentric astronomy), Newtonian mechanics replacing Aristotelian physics, Einstein’s relativity overturning Newtonian space and time. 

4 . Incommensurability According to Kuhn, old and new paradigms are often incommensurable: they use different concepts, standards, and languages, making direct comparison difficult. Thus, a revolution is not just progress but a redefinition of reality itself within the scientific community.

 IMRE LAKATOS (1922–1974) 

 Developed the idea of “research programmes” as a refinement of Kuhn’s paradigms. Each programme has a “hard core” (fundamental assumptions that are not easily abandoned) and a “protective belt” (auxiliary hypotheses that can be adjusted to handle anomalies). Unlike Kuhn’s abrupt revolutions, Lakatos sees science as competing research programmes where one is judged progressive (predicting novel facts) or degenerative (patching itself defensively). Example: Newtonian mechanics gradually giving way to Einstein’s relativity can be seen as the rise of a progressive programme. 

 PAUL FEYERABEND (1924–1994) 

 Famous for Against Method (1975). He rejected rigid paradigms altogether, advocating epistemological anarchism: “anything goes.” For him, science advances not by fixed paradigms or methods, but by pluralism, creativity, and often by breaking rules. He agreed with Kuhn that scientific revolutions involve radical shifts, but stressed the messy, unpredictable, and political side of them. 

 LARRY LAUDAN (1941–2022) 

Proposed “research traditions” (similar to Kuhn’s paradigms and Lakatos’s programmes). He emphasized the problem-solving effectiveness of a tradition as its measure of success. Instead of incommensurable breaks, Laudan envisioned a more continuous, rational debate between traditions. 

 BRUNO LATOUR 

From the 1980s onward, Latour and others in Sociology/anthropology of science describe paradigm shifts not as purely intellectual but as network reconfigurations involving instruments, institutions, and power. For Latour, a “revolution” is a realignment of both ideas and material practices. 

SO, 

Kuhn introduced paradigms and incommensurability. 

Lakatos systematized it into research programmes. 

Feyerabend radicalized it with epistemological anarchism. 

Laudan softened it into rational research traditions. 

Latour reframed it as network transformations.