When you adopt a theory it has to be on basic merits: 1. simplicity: a small number of assumptions, 2. consistency: lack of internal contradictions, 3. conservatism: quality of fitting with previous proven knowledge, and 4. fruitfullness: the ability to make predictions.
Determinism: Let's go one by one, determinism seems simple enough, me move from an argument about the macro world (physics) to an argument about the microworld (our neurons). It all seems to follow causal relations. From Cosmic causality to neurophysiology, to clinical psychology to Freudian theory, etc, it all seems to follow a deterministic path.
In psychological terms, we are determined by previous patterns of behavior, in neurophysiological terms, we are determined by behavioral neuroscience. There is also our genetic makeup.
The implications for human behavior into morals is that we are not responsible for our actions.
And this seems a problem of scientific dissonance since most of our human sciences depend on a different analysis. That is, free will.
Compatibilism: The traditional version seems to balance both free will and determinism. The TC accepts determinism at the macro level, but not so at the micro level. Here we enter a supervenient property: the mind. The mind causes our actions via the will. We will from the inside. But not always. When not? When there are external constraints. How much of this prevents our willingness. Here we go back to Freud's superego. The constraints are not internal, but external. The consequence makes sense for morality. We're responsible for our free actions.
The Hierarchical version offers a more limited picture. We can observe three addicts from the outside believing they are free, while only one is: the happy addict.
A counterargument here is Slote's hypnotized patient. He believes he is choosing X from Y, but the truth is that he is acting on SOV planted by the hypnotist.
Libertarianism: Here free actions are caused by selves. Libertarians believe in determinism agent causation and event causation. Yes, events can cause events (physics), but agents also cause events at the supervenient level (philosophy of the mind). Their argument is pretty good. We feel as if we deliberate and cause our actions. Why would this be a false picture? It doesn't make sense from the evolutionary point of view to develop an inner sense that is totally deceiving and disconnected from reality.
The counter argument comes from Libet's experiment.
Libertarians offer a rebuttal. They counter that Libet is not measuring conscious activity, but "metaconscious" activity. What's that? We are in metaconscious mode when we think that we think. Being aware of being aware is second-order awareness, which explains the delay of 150 msec between the EEG and EMG.
If libertarianism is true, we are responsible for our actions. It explains why social engineering is doomed to fail. Think of the examples in the USSR for 80 years. And why two brothers raised in the same environment produce different personalities with different behaviors.
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