Chapter 5 (From hard determinism to Libertarianism)

1. Causal Determinism (every event has a cause that makes it happen + laws of nature). CD is a theory about the universe. 

Then there is Hard determinism the doctrine that if Causal Determinism is true, then there are no free actions. 

CD: C-->E + Laws of Nature.

HD: If CD is true, then there are no free actions. 

Hard determinism assumes that if the CD is true, then there are no free actions because, as our bodies are made up of matter, we must be subject to the same laws of causation. 

Furthermore, If HD is true, then there is no human responsibility. 

We cannot be responsible for our actions (since we are responsible if and only if we can make choices). 

What's good here? Determinism seems a reasonable explanation for the physics of the macro universe. And it's the consensus in the physicalist disciplines: psychiatry, neurophysiology, etc.  

However, the idea that there's no free will presents challenges to other disciplines, like ethics (which conceives a free subject responsible for their actions) and jurisprudence. 

2. Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive.

Soft determinism: Determined actions can nevertheless be free. Compatibilists defend the nature/nurture argument. Free will is, then, 

Traditional Compatibilism (Free actions must be 1. caused by one's will and 2. not externally constrained). 

Here's the reasoning:

Principle of alternative possibilities: one can be held responsible for doing something only if one could have done otherwise. 

See it like a two-tooth fork: 

You have barely enough time to get to Triff's class. So here's the fork:

1. You want to be on time for Triff's class. 

2. You also want to have coffee @ McDonalds before class. 

"Could have done otherwise" means "if you had chosen otherwise, then you would have done otherwise." 

Suppose you have coffee and end up being late for class. Is your being late for class a free action? YES. IT IS. For you could've forfeit doing 2. but did not. 

Compatibilists believe that what you want to do is entirely determined by what's encoded in your genes (your nature) and the sort of experiences that you've had (how you were nurtured). 

Despite all that, compatibilists STILL claim that you can act freely as long as your actions are caused by your mental states. 

Counterexample to compatibilism: "Taylor's Ingenious Physiologist". 

Taylor envisions a situation where a weird physiologist plants desires into his patient via DBS Deep Brain Stimulation, (without the patient's knowledge). For example the volition to raise my hand. And the hand moves! If so, both conditions of compatibility are met: 1. his actions are caused by his will, and 2. he's not externally constrained.   

In class, we have discussed how TV can "plant" desires. I can watch a movie on TV. In the scene someone drinks whiskey in a relaxed setting with soft lighting and background music. All of a sudden, I go to my bar and poured myself some whiskey, and keep watching the movie. What happened? The TV planted my desire (to drink whiskey) and I caused a volition (stood up and walked to the bar and poured myself a drink). Is my action free? 

Well, I didn't have the desire to drink before the scene. Clearly the movie planted a desire and I, automatically, acted on it. 

So, in a way TV can be a kind of ingenious physiologist.

Is there an advantage to Traditional Comaptibilism? Well, if you're in favor of the idea of human responsibility Traditional Compatibilism seems a good theory. It acknowledges some determinism (external constraints) while making room for free will. It seems plausible that external constraints play a definite role in our lives and restrict our willing from the inside, and therefore our responsibility. 

PUNISHMENT

Unlike incompatibilists, who believe that accepting determinism requires rejecting our ordinary practices eye for an eye and retribution, compatibilists believe that we can continue to praise and blame as long as we are clear about why we do it.  

Howerver for compatibilists, the only purpose of punishment is REHABILITATION AND DETERRENCE. Punishment is concerned with causes and motives of conduct. Punishment cannot be retributive (eye-for-an-eye). The only legitimate way of punishment is rehabilitation and deterrence. Criminal actions are dictated by genes and habits (nature and nurture). Retributive punishment makes sense if it's deserved. But nothing people do is up to them.

So, PUNISHMENT IS AN EDUCATIVE MEASURE. IT MEANS THE FORMATION OF MOTIVES TO PREVENT THE WRONGDOER FROM REPEATING THE ACT (REFORMATION) AND PREVENT OTHERS FROM COMMITTING THE ACT (PREVENTION). 

FOR COMPATIBILISTS RETRIBUTION IS NOT A LEGITIMATE REASON FOR PUNISHMENT.  

3. HIERARCHICAL COMPATIBILISM: There are First and Second Order Desires and Second Order Volitions. 

Remember: A first-order desire (FOD) is directed (outside) to an object or state of affairs, a second-order (SOD) desire is a desire about a desire. A second-order volition (SOV)  is a second-order desire on which one decisively acts. 

Harry Frankfurt's three different addicts: 

1. Wanton addict: FOD, not SOD, not SOV, not free. 
2. Happy Addict: FOD, SOD, SOV, free.
3. Unwilling Addict: FOD, SOD (only this desire is against his taking the drug), SOV, but now he cannot act on these SOV, so he's not free). Remember, to be free one has to either formulate a SOV or be able to act on it. 

Analysis: 

1. The wanton addict has no second-order volitions (SOD). Just like an animal that wants something and gets it, the wanton addict never questions or reflects on his FOD. He just satisfies them. So, the wanton addict doesn't have any SOV. 

2. The happy addict acts freely because he acts on his second-order volition to take the drug. This means that a drug addict can act freely. 

3. The Unwilling addict FOD, SOD, and SOV, but he's incapable of acting on it. Though he desires not to act on his desire to take the drug, he can't help himself. He's a slave to his drug habit.

Why is hierarchical compatibility better than traditional compatibilism?

Traditional Compatibilism takes that drug addicts who suffer from compulsive disorders or are brainwashed into their addictions are free when their actions are not coerced by external constraints. 

Hierarchical compatibilism explains that drug addicts can be free, and it explains why. They have not either formulated second-order desires (like the wanton addict) or failed to act on them (the happy addict). 

Hierarchical compatibilism explains the importance of free will. People who act on their second-order volitions do what they want to do; they are their own persons. 

Hierarchical compatibilism has more explanatory power than traditional compatibilism.  

Hierarchical compatibilism also explains why animals don't have free will. Animals, especially mammals, are self-conscious, but they don't seem able to formulate second-order desires. Cows can't form a desire not to overeat. In other words, non-human animals seem to be wanton. 

Now comes the riddle: Can an SOV be caused by forces outside our control? 

Counterexample to Hierarchical Compatibilism: Slote's Hypnotized patient. Robert is undecided between two desires, X and Y. He is visited by a hypnotist who, unbeknownst to Robert, puts him in a trance and induces an SOV in favor of X. Now, as a result of having this SOV planted, he acts to satisfy X, never suspecting that the hypnotist has induced his decisiveness. So, we have satisfied Hierarchical Compatibilism for free action, and yet, Robert is not free because his second-order volition is not his.  

4. LIBERTARIANISM

We have two types of causation: event causation and agent causation. When an event causes an event, there's a physical causation. For example, Gravitation. Agent causation is different. Here, we have an agent causing an event. For example, free will. 

Libertarianism holds that agents can cause events. How? The mind supervenes the brain. We call this process FREE WILL. 

There are two arguments: 1) Argument from Experience. 2) Argument from deliberation.

1) We experience ourselves willing the action from the inside. 

2) We feel as if we deliberate options and make decisions.  

Libet's Neurophysiological challenge: It shows that consciousness of a decision arises only after the decision has already been made (the 300-millisecond gap between the decision to press the button and the brain signal). 

Rebuttal by libertarians: There's a difference between making a "conscious decision" and a "meta-conscious decision" (meta-conscious awareness is second order). For the libertarian, the subject in Libet's report is not having a "conscious" but a "meta-conscious" decision. So, it's no surprise that it happens "after" the conscious decision was made.
 
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Radical Libertarianism: Jean-Paul Sartre's libertarianism (Existentialism) holds that the self is essentially free. Sartre's analysis is ontological. Let's begin with this point about essence & existence: 

Existence precedes essence. It means that I am what I do with my freedom (existence) and what I am (my essence) depends on it. It also means that we exist first and are "defined" later. This happens because the self (consciousness) is in a constant state of becoming. 

To cope with our own boundless freedom, we devise a justification for our actions, which Sartre calls bad faith. Imagine an abused wife in a relationship with an alcoholic. She blames her husband for her misery. And yet, as unhappy as she is, she maintains the relationship. Time and again, she goes through the experience and tells people about how horrible her life is. But she goes back to his husband. For Sartre, this woman is in bad faith. She blames others for her inability to leave her toxic relationship.

However, since not choosing is choosing, she remains responsible for her actions in the end.  

The only possible constraint on our freedom is our facticity . Facticity is my height, genes, parents, etc. Things I don't and can't choose.

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Aquí la conclusión del capítulo.