Monday, September 30, 2013

pink slime in your food


you like pink slime?
a filler produced by treating finely ground beef scraps with ammonia hydroxide to kill pathogens. Beef Products Inc. last week temporarily suspended production at three plants because of consumer concerns. U.S. Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack said March 28 that the product, referred to in the industry as lean, finely textured beef, is safe to eat.
who uses that? McDonalds! 

check the Jamie Oliver's video (scroll down to watch it).

kareem abdul-jabaar's philosophy


pretty good philosophical advice for all young guys. 

Friday, September 27, 2013

thank me for losing paradise (post for comment)

Two excesses: to exclude reason, to admit nothing but reason.- Pascal, Pensées.

The title of my post has a rebellious Adam saying those very words to his wife Eve after a long day or labor in the field, outside the Garden of Eden. He realizes that Paradise, at the price of ignorance, was not worth having. If the story is plausible, Adam is the first Yogi.
I get the impression that you think these ideas we're discussing are "utopic." Yet, there is no imperative here to bring back a paradise to earth. Why? Because reality is a duck-rabbit proposition. Tough, deceiving, at times sublime, inevitable, i.e., paradoxical? What Yoga seeks is a method for personal development and community enlightenment. A yogi understands that he cannot build a "world" of like-minded yogis, just as we cannot impose a paradise of like-minded proletarians. Paradise is another form of self-induced Alzheimer!

Thus, this closing of 3rd Section of the Sutras:
When the presiding-deities invite, there should be no attachment and no smile of satisfaction, contact with undesirable being again possible (III, 50).
Via ahimsa, Yoga is amenable to deep ecology and the plight for justice and equality, provided by asteya for all of sentient beings. of course we must include non-human animals. it makes perfect sense!
Let’s get into the enstasis part. We are trying to give the Sutras a different spin: Yama is now a techné aimed at perfecting the self. "Reincarnation" becomes a metaphor for the never ending process of identity renewal. Meditation means seeking worthwhile thoughts as a mean to achieve niyama, which depends of yamaAsana is comportment, a way of paying attention to my body (yes, the body IS important) while simultaneously being aware of other bodies, something not unlike the idea of an athlete in the West (a healthy body + a clean mind built through the discipline of the sport). I surmise that athletes have an x-tra sense of peoples’ bodies that neophytes simply lack (it'd be nice to have LeBron defending this point).
With dharana and dhyana we engage in a discussion about the form vs. content of meditation. When it comes to dharana, yoga practice exhibits a perplexing degree of fetishism. It seems that for the mind to get deeper into itself it needs to transcend itself (by purging itself). And so, dharana is an anteroom to dhyana.
Homelessness: Because of the very structure of pakriti and purusha, we are ontologically homeless. This idea resonates in Freudian psychoanalytic theory (Spaltung), where the Self is divided, and in Existentialism, where Being = Nothingness.
Why can one not be God? -asks the disciple.
You are, -says the master. -But you have to find out by yourself.-- Swami Vivekananda.
Coming back to Martin example of the moon being reflected on the lake. Some level of aesthetic abeyance can make one agree with the Romantic poet contemplating Nature's beauty and thinking “I could very well die now,” (which obviously doesn’t happen in all lakes at all times). This lucky teeny mini-samadhi is sudden, ephemeral, accidental and unregulated (Yoga aims at regulating these samadhis). Yet, it makes us aware that we’re capable of achieving high-quality awareness (the idea being that one can bring it forth through discipline and effort). Does it make sense to investigate this further?

Let's bring the point home. One may feel materially lucky for having and enjoying what lots of people in this world can only dream of having (i.e., driving a car, eating a nice meal, going to school and having these cool conversations about philosophy, etc), so that one may feel responsible for that demand of the invisible other(“invisible” in the sense that we avoid their gaze and pass them in silence). It makes me think of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas: In his book Totality and Infinity, he talks about “le rapport sans rapport,” (a demand that sometimes is quite heavy to bear and may go unanswered). Not unlike Jesus’s imperative on the Sermon of the Mount: “You shall love your enemy”. Now, what’s that?
Michaelangelo Pistoletto, Venus of the Rags, (1974).
Some of you may be thinking that all this Yoga stuff is a sham. And I could never prove to you it’s not. What I can do is plead with Pascal: you will lose nothing by trying it
(I'm closing this post next Wednesday at 11pm)

Thursday, September 26, 2013

problematizing anthropocentrism

we are humans. we think like humans. but that doesn't mean we shouldn't problematize our thinking as. the problem is not thinking as humans, that's what we are. rather the problem is to be blind to subterranean ideologies. the "centric" in anthropocentric is the exclusiveness of the "human" species, being the top of the ladder, being the best evolved, etc, etc.

what is the negotiation between human & non-human?

1- from the outside: in jainism (or yoga) all is ONE. you don't see the ant as non-human but as ONE.
2- from the inside: anthropomorphic intentionality (an empathy business), whereby I see the ant as me-being-an-ant.

so, anthropomorphism can actually help de-centering. on the other hand it's naive to suppose we can actually become centered-less (this thought doesn't come from anthropocentrism), it comes from a critical stance to blind-spot values.

blind spots are actually closet "moments" where we pretend to ourselves be outside it.  

writing a philosophy paper (don't panic, it's easy)


ok, it's time to prepare for the final paper. wait, don't panic.

here is how to do it.

more tips.

there are three topics to pick from:

1- same sex marriage (here in the US or abroad)
2- human consumption and the problem of animal rights & animal dignity
3- how to deal with world poverty?
4- the problem of women's rights in the world

if you have any questions ask me (the comment box is open).
i've decided, the paper should follow MLA conventions.  
we will discuss length next week.

a valuable link from bard college.

Wednesday, September 25, 2013

what is the brain?


as per our discussion introducing section 2.1.

The brain performs an incredible number of tasks including the following:

•It controls body temperature, blood pressure, heart rate and breathing.
•It accepts a flood of information about the world around you from your various senses (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching).
•It handles your physical movement when walking, talking, standing or sitting.
•It lets you think, dream, reason and experience emotions.

Tuesday, September 24, 2013

deeper than god

that's this piece's title in the NYTimes by professor stanley fish.
... to what extent and on what basis should constitutional protection be afforded to religious activities, especially when those activities are in conflict with settled law? Any answer to that question must first define what religion is (something the courts have never been able to do), and Dworkin begins boldly in his very first sentence: “The theme of this book is that religion is deeper than God.” Dworkin doesn’t mean that being religious and believing in God are incompatible; he means that the latter is a possible version of, but not the essence of, the former.
"religion" comes --according to Cicero-- from relegere "go through again" (in reading or in thought), from re- "again" (see re-) + legere "read" (see lecture (n.). among later ancients (Servius, Lactantius, Augustine) religare means "to bind fast," via notion of "place an obligation on," or "bond between humans and gods."

if so, being religious is being part of a like-minded community. a religion can be secular but deeper in another sense of revising our obligations. to whom, to what?

what's here? locally, our community. globally this, our world (and nature).

Tuesday, September 17, 2013

food for tongue (pertaining today's class)

art by urs fischer

a lot was discussed in class and it seemed more chaotic than usual. but chaos is brahman. let's see if i'm successful at explaining my points:

1- is taste a genetic disposition? i read this hypothesis @ the smithsonian:
Collecting genetic samples from 143 children and their mothers, the researchers showed moms and kids who had at least one bitter-sensitive region in the gene were generally able to detect even a hint of bitter flavor in a test drink.
that's not the whole story: "bitter" is one amongst a broader palette that includes "sweet," "umami," "sour" and "salty" (for a total of 5). the study goes on to make a more problematic conclusion:
The study also found children who had the bitter taste gene preferred higher levels of the sucrose solution they were given in the study. Researchers point out that as we age, life experience begins to override genetic disposition for taste. "Nature versus nurture" refers to an ongoing debate about how much genes are responsible for an individual's traits, compared to how much is due to the environment around the person. 
i'm of the latter persuasion, yet the institute of health makes it even more open-ended:
Recent advances in the understanding of taste at the molecular level have provided candidate genes that can be evaluated for contributions to phenotypic differences in taste abilities. However, many aspects of taste perception remain poorly characterized. Better understanding of the molecular components of salty and sour tastes is still needed, as is a more complete picture of second messenger and downstream signaling mechanisms for all taste modalities. More general studies of linkage and association between genetic markers and taste phenotypes may reveal genes encoding proteins
So, it seems that we cannot conclusively say that taste is genetic nor discount it, --as i seemed (too quickly to sort of imply in class). my problem is with the following argument:

since there's much we don't still don't understand about the influence of genetic traits in our dispositions, let's assume that genetics plays a bigger role in our dispositions.  

but this is at best misleading and at worst fallacious. our experience with food is that of constant negotiation. and this negotiation is cultural, psychological and part of our personal narratives. taste seems as arbitrary as our predilections for music (the comparison has been made time and again). if so, then taste seems to reveal something very unique about our personal dispositions. how about psychological factors? example: one can always reevaluate what one used to dislike (as veronica seemed to suggest with her pizza hut example). on the other hand, one can --inexplicably-- like something one used to dislike (my daughter hated broccoli until she tried it at the suggestion of her vegetarian boyfriend). taste is susceptible to hormonal causation. now, is hormonal activity causally determined by our genes? actually, the opposite seems to be the case.  so, does "nurture" win? this site presents four possible taste enhancers/inhibitors: 1- stress, 2- breathing through your mouth, 3- acid reflux, & 4- general sensitivity.

french sociologist pierre bordieu has written about taste in food & music as social indicators of "class" since "trends" in consumption seemingly correlate with an individual’s fit in society.  take for example our obsession with surgery as "cultural beauty," or our obsession with junk food (which really took off started in the 1970's). consumer interests based on differing social positions necessitates that each fraction "has its own artists and philosophers, newspapers and critics, just as it has its hairdresser, interior decorator, or tailor."

i suggest the following experiment: take a one-year-old child from argentina & japan and permutate their environments: the japanese to go to argentina and viceversa. do you see a problem for each child ending up eating the diet of the adoptive parents? after a few years you have a sushi-lover, meat-avoider argentinian & a steak-eater, raw-fish-avoider japanese.

2- as per hitler. are you familiar with godwin's law? let's try to avoid the guy for the time being. my contention is that there have been many hitlers in history --only we did not record their atrocities.

3- i passed over jose's last argument. i didn't really get it. but there was this other argument about why preferring a certain individual over another based on his/her intentional-volitional dispositions. and i wonder is it her ratnatraya dispositions that makes her special? i think of aristotle, for whom "character" (from the greek kharakter = engraved mark) is an expression of the volitional states of the human subject.

a good character a expresses (arete = "that which is good") his/her internal dispositions. so, via aristotle, all of a sudden ratnatraya makes sense! why is it good to cultivate rview, rknowledge, rfaith? because it makes the subject stand out spiritually. it's like asking: why would you prefer a friend that is forward, aware, honest & generous over one that is selfish, ignorant & dishonest?

is your preference a matter of preference or is it rather an attribute of his character?

Friday, September 13, 2013

karma, our class, free will & duck rabbit (post for comment)

art by scott greenwalt

1- my slip of tongue on the issue of reincarnation. i said: "i don't believe in reincarnation." of course what i meant was "reincarnation" as a soul (after biological death) beginning a new life in a new body (whether animal or human or spiritual) depending on the moral quality of the previous life's actions. but that doesn't take away the viability of the metaphor (we've talked about the importance of metaphors already).

2- many of the rough edges in reasoning have to do with what kind of suit do you wear to a philosophy class.

3- the problem of free will & determinism keeps surfacing. good. you have to come to terms with this trifecta:

determinism
compatibilism
libertarianism (not political, but volitional)

once you do, your analysis gets more focused. by the way, it's also ok. to suspend the issue until you feel better about it. there are no easy --or quick-- answers here.

4- there was a question at the end of the class regarding what am i learning here? look, when we tackle a system (hinduism, now), we present it within a historic frame, then we discuss the metaphysics (after all this is a philosophy class) and finally we read the main texts in class. i prefer to touch the issues and problematize them (it makes for richer deeper discussions). which brings me to this point: our discussions are not mere rantings. they touch important points and offer provisional solutions. we must be open minded and understand that the to-and-fro of philosophical discussion is quite productive. do you feel a bit lost? after two or three class lectures and discussions i bet you'll feel better.  there is no single view of hinduism. that doesn't mean that in the end one can come up with some generalities. there are many different schools with contrasting metaphysics, texts, avatars, narratives, etc. and what happens is that the more you try to simplify (and i'd argue that simplicity for its own sake is not necessarily a virtue), the more you end up with fallacious reductionisms. just be a little patient. if you're a little bewildered, think of duck/rabbit! (more of this in the weeks ahead).


coming back to 1- is there a conclusive way to establish that bad actions lead to bad karma? what does it mean that one ends up badly? if there is a difference between being good and being evil? well, the psychological states of an evil person (even character) cannot be the same as that of a good person.why? the difference between the two lies in what aristotle calls eudaimonia.  if aristotle had known the jaina idea of karma, he would have agreed that a virtuous person has better karma than that of an evil person (aristotle did not believe in reincarnation either).

5- i want to invite you to become a friend of m.bourbaki.  

6- anything else that i forgot?

(i close this post next wednesday at 11pm, but prefer you to make comments by tuesday)

Some theological and philosophical implications of Jainism

*Every living being has a soul: divine, with innate, though typically unrealized, potentially immense knowledge, perception, power, and bliss.
*Therefore, regard every living being as yourself, harm no one, and manifest benevolence for all living beings.
*Every soul is born as a sort of celestial, human or sub-human or hellish being according to its own karmas.
*Every soul is the architect of its own life, here or hereafter. (Yes, freedom exists!)
*When a soul is freed from karmas,2 it becomes free and god-conscious, experiencing infinite knowledge, perception, power, and bliss.
*Right View, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct (triple gems of Jainism) provide the way to this realization.
*There is no supreme divine creator, owner, preserver or destroyer: The universe is self-regulated and every soul has the potential to achieve the status of god-consciousness (siddha) through one's own efforts.

*Non-violence (Ahimsa) is the foundation of right View, the existence of right Knowledge and the kernel of right Conduct. Non-violence is compassion and forgiveness in thoughts, words and actions toward all living beings. It includes respecting views of others (Non-absolutism). Is Ahimsa not a better face-to-face?
*Limit possessions and lead a pure life that is useful to yourself and others. Owning an object by itself is not possessiveness; however attachment to an object is. Non-possessiveness is the balancing of needs and desires while staying detached from our possessions.
*Enjoy the company of the holy and better qualified, be merciful to those afflicted and tolerate the perversely inclined.
*Four things are difficult for a soul to attain: 1. human birth (the one you own), 2. true knowledge, 3. good faith, and 4. practicing the right path.
*It is important not to waste human life in evil ways. Rather, strive to rise on the ladder of spiritual evolution.
*The goal of Jainism is liberation of the soul from the negative effects of unenlightened thoughts, speech and action. This goal is achieved through clearance of karmic obstructions.

Wednesday, September 11, 2013

T 5:40pm class

TR, 9:50am class

MWF, 10am class

MWF, 9am class

Do animals deserve a better treatment? (post for comment)


This video is moving.  A Brazilian boy argues with her mother about eating meat. Animals shouldn't be killed. He expresses his reasons as a philosopher. What is he getting at? There is something to be said about this received notion that animals are simply there for us to produce and kill. At least we should examine the reasons from the philosophical standpoint.

Do you know what you eat? I mean your meat? Where does it come from? My question makes sense. If we rewind the tape back 50,000 years ago, you're hunting with other males for the meat you'll bring back to your community. You fight, risk your life, partake in the ritual of eviscerating the animal. That meat taste and feels different than the wrapped package of ribs you get at your supermarket. That's a section of the animal, already processed (fed, raised, killed, cleaned, cut into pieces, packaged, etc). What kind of treatment did that animal received? What's the ecological impact of the animal's byproducts? Is it better or worse for the economy that we farm animals in an industrially intense manner?  (click this link for a better understanding of the ecological implications of animal factory farming).

I'd like to point to three ways of looking at this problem:

1- Can animals be said to deserve better than merely taken as "food stuff?" Could we ever see animals as worthy of (deserving) certain rights? If so which? 2- Now, suppose you disagree with granting animals rights, while acknowledging that they certainly deserve a better treatment. 3- Could we make an ecological argument that is human-centered (that is, it works in our best interest, not necessarily in the animal's interest) and still advocates a better treatment for animals?     

________

Philosophical perspectives:

Trough the 18th and 19th Century philosophers like Rousseau, Kant, Bentham and Schopenhauer produced different arguments in favor of a different kind of approach. 

Rousseau writes:
It appears, in fact, that if I am bound to do no injury to my fellow-creatures, this is less because they are rational than because they are sentient beings: and this quality, being common both to men and beasts, ought to entitle the latter at least to the privilege of not being wantonly ill-treated by the former.
Kant's idea runs parallel to my post below, about animal cruelty. He believes that "cruelty to animals is contrary to man's duty to himself, because it deadens in him the feeling of sympathy for their sufferings, and thus a natural tendency that is very useful to morality in relation to other humans is weakened." It turns that Kant's point is being revised now as an psychological aspect linked to criminology.

But one thing is to say that they shouldn't be mistreated and another is to say that they should enjoy certain rights. What are the arguments in favor of animal rights?

Peter Singer defends animal rights from their ability feel pain. Since animals have no language, leading scientists argue that it is impossible to know when an animal is suffering. This situation may change as increasing numbers of chimps are taught sign language, although skeptics question whether their use of it portrays real understanding. Singer writes that, following the argument that language is needed to communicate pain, it would often be impossible to know when humans are in pain. All we can do is observe pain behavior, he writes, and make a calculated guess based on it. As Ludwig Wittgenstein argued, if someone is screaming, clutching a part of their body, moaning quietly, or apparently unable to function, especially when followed by an event that we believe would cause pain in ourselves, that is in large measure what it means to be in pain. Singer argues that there is no reason to suppose animal pain behavior would have a different meaning.


Tom Regan argues that animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life," and as such are bearers of rights. He argues that, because the moral rights of humans are based on their possession of certain cognitive abilities, and because these abilities are also possessed by at least some non-human animals, such animals must have the same moral rights as humans. Although only humans act as moral agents, both marginal-case humans, such as infants, and at least some non-humans must have the status of "moral patients." Moral patients are unable to formulate moral principles, and as such are unable to do right or wrong, even though what they do may be beneficial or harmful. Only moral agents are able to engage in moral action. Animals for Regan have "inherent value" as subjects-of-a-life, and cannot be regarded as a means to an end.


Some critics of Regan, like Roger Scruton, argue that rights also imply obligations, which animals cannot be forced to have (although Scruton disagrees with Regan over the issue of rights, he opposes factory farming).

On the other hand, professor Carl Cohen from the University of Michigan and the University of Michigan Medical School, opposes the idea granting personhood to animals, arguing that rights holders must be able to distinguish between their own interests and what is right. Cohen writes:
"The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, [they] ... must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked."
Against professor Cohen, one could argue that babes cannot understand the rights they enjoy. Surely, we consider them our offspring. Being humans, they are already granted with rights.

Abolitionism

It falls within the framework of the rights-based approach, though it regards only one right as necessary: the right not to be owned. Abolitionists argue that the key to reducing animal suffering is to recognize that legal ownership of sentient beings is unjust and must be abolished.

The most prominent of the abolitionists is Gary Francione, professor of law and philosophy at Rutgers School of Law-Newark. He argues that focusing on animal welfare may actually worsen the position of animals, because it entrenches the view of them as property, and makes the public more comfortable about using them.

There is no doubt that we treat animals as a means to an end. And the justification seems pretty anthropocentric: Meat is good for our survival. But is it true? Is not meat-production and meat-eating ultimately worse in terms of the ecosystem and out health? Are we not being duped by our meat addiction when in fact the opposite is true?
In India, for example, there are no animal rights, but people don't eat meat. It's embedded in the culture.

Animal vs. Environment

In the discussion of animal rights few people ask what are the consequences of factory farming for the environment? Our present environmental crisis forces us to reexamine our concept of moral standing. Traditionally, it is claimed, only human beings were thought to matter, morally speaking; but the environmental crisis win not be resolved until we break with tradition and acknowledge that nonhuman nature also has moral standing.
If the crisis is defined anthropocentrically, i.e., in terms of a threat to human survival or well-being, then enlightened anthropocentrism requires us to resolve the environmental crisis. If, on the other hand, the crisis is defined non-anthropocentrically, in terms of a kind of human mistreatment of nonhuman animals, plants, and ecosystems, then in even saying that there is a crisis we are already assuming an answer to the question of whether nonhuman nature has moral standing, the very question the environmental crisis was invoked to motivate. A clearer way to proceed is by talking in terms of the extent to which an ethic provides philosophical support for goals commonly espoused in the environmental movement, goals such as:

1. preservation of species, wilderness, and special habitats such as wetlands, estuaries, rain forests, and deserts;
2. reintroduction of locally extinct species including large predators, removal of exotic species, and adaptation of agricultural and landscaping practices to the local biota;
3. substantial reduction of the global human population, and
4. reduced reliance on chemicals in agriculture and reduced air and water emissions.
But this belongs in a different post addressing animal consumption vis-a-vis environmental degradation, which will be analyzed in a future post.

What's your take? When you eat meat, do you think about any of these issues. Why or why not? 

(the minimum of words per comment = 150. no capital letters, no vulgar language. try to make an informed comment and give reasons. write the best way you can without being pedantic).

karma, god, karma-bandha


karma: skt "deed." 1- a mental or physical action, 2- the consequence of a mental or physical action, 3- the sum of all consequences of the actions of an individual in this or a previous life, 4- the chain of cause and effect in the realm of morality. in buddhism, is known as pali kamma. the deed falls upon the one responsible. the deed leaves a physical/volitional trace in the mind of the doer, and informs his/her future actions (positively or negatively). what matters here is the intention of the action. generally deeds that contain "himsa" are bound to a negative karmic effect.
_____________   

GOD/karma: in jainism, karma operates as a self-sustaining mechanism, a sort of physical universal law. there's no need of external causation to keep it going (thus the absence of an exogenous GOD in jainism).

jain theology advocates the idea that a soul's karma changes even with the thoughts, and not just the actions. thinking evil endures a karma-bandha, i.e., increment in "bad" karma ("bad" here is a debit, seen from the universal law... which? the regulating principle of ahimsa = no-harming).

this is why the ratnatraya (right c, right f, right k)  gives a very strong emphasis to samyak dhyan (rationality in thoughts) and samyak darshan (rationality in perception) and not just samyak charitra (rationality in conduct).

in jain theology, a soul is released of worldly affairs as soon as it is able to emancipate from the karm-bandha. the idea being that there's an "ascetism" of the mind (not just the body) it consists in fighting mind-violence. letting the mind inhabit ahimsa. fighting himsa in the mind is of great importance.

a question was asked in class related to free will, is moksha possible as a result of free will? YES.

the karmic theory in jainism operates endogenously. even tirthankaras (such as mahavira) are not attributed "godhood". tirthankaras themselves have to go through the stages of emancipation, for attaining that state. jainism treats all souls equally. all souls have the same potential of attaining nirvana. only those who make effort, really attain it (of course, here comes the accumulated karma, i.e., karma-bandha (or papa)  liabilities that have to be paid back. no more credit once one moves on! but nonetheless, each soul is capable on its own to do attain perfection by gradually reducing its karma.

Friday, September 6, 2013

NIYAMSARA (the sacred book of Jainism)

NIYAMSARA is the sacred book of the Jainas

CHAPTER ONE: JIVA

1. Bowing to Vira Jina, who, by nature is the possessor of infinite and supreme knowledge and conation; I shall compose Niyama-Sara, preached by Kevalis and the Shruta- Kevalis. Shri Kunda-Kunda Acharya renders homage to the last of the twenty-four Thirthankaras, Lord Mahavira, who also called Vira, and enshrines Hi to his heart for the purification of his thoughts; so that he may be able to fulfil his undertaking successfully. Further, the Acharya express it emphatically that whatever he will write will not be his own independet teching, but will be fully based upon the authoritative pronouncement of Kevalis and Shruta-Kevali.
2. In the Jaina Scriptures, the Path and the Fruit of the Path are described as the two parts. The means of liberation constitute the Path, and liberation is the Fruit.
3. What is in reality worth doing (is) Niyama, and that is belief, knowledge, and conduct. In order to avoid deflection the word Sara has been particularly affixed to it.
4. Niyama (is) the way to liberation; its fruit is supreme Nirvana. Each of these, is again described. 5. Belief in the Perfect Souls, the Scriptures and the Principles is Right Belief. He who is free from all defects and is possessed of all (pure) attributes is the supreme source.
 6. (The defect are) hunger, fear, anger, attachment, delusion, anxiety, old age, disease, death, perspiration, fatigue, pride, indulgence, surprise, sleep, birth, and restlessness.
 7. One free from all defects and possessed of sublime grandeur such as Omniscience is called Parmâtmâ (the Highest Soul) or the Perfect One. One who is not such, (is) not Parmatma .
 8. Words proceeding from his mouth, pure and free from the flaw of inconsistency are called Âgama (Scripture.) In that Âgama the principles (Tattvartha) are enunciated.

(continues here)

Thursday, September 5, 2013

a thought about a self-conscious Godverse

for the Godverse to be self-conscious you would need the Godverse + 1!

Tuesday, September 3, 2013

shu, li, zhong yong and the battle now!

early, late earth?

i'd like to stress the importance of li in relation with shu & try to problematize the quadrant of prudence (yan ren) with decisiveness (ming). the answer is zhong-yong. the right balance that best reflects t'ien. as it turns, the only way to achieve zhong-yong is practicing it.

this reflects the chun-tzu. one can read zhong-yong with aristotle glasses:
in everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect (ethica eudemia, 1106, a 2629)
intermediate between excess and defect, which is why zhu xi, the neo-confucianist master would advise,

"a friend should neither be too close or too remote." (a deep thought)

this middle is zhong-yong. one more thing. zhong-yong has two sides: xing is the internal (thought-driven), while li is external, (behavior-oriented). the problem of unifying the li and xing is exactly the problem of combining and unifying the internal and the external. zhong-yong can be seen as a balance between internal(self)/external(others)-axis intersecting a consensus/community axis. according to confucius, this is how we become political & social individuals. there is no possibility of jen (virtue) without a community.    
what we learn from confucianism concerning li is that as society, we face a disorientation. rituals have become fetishized. there's a fresh, redeeming possibility for genuine exchange, but it takes to turn the present value of the ritual upside down. 

perhaps in the face of fetishized and stereotyped rituals we have the imperative to create our own li from scratch. decisiveness is critical to find transcultural lost symbols, reinscribing them into new contexts. there is always room for transformation and novelty. our generation is in need of material and spiritual actions-and-reactions. we could help replenish our community with a renewed sense of purpose. in the end this yajna, only a bit different. an offering to our possible best selves. 

we have speculated in class whether we still have time to change things in the world. what if that vision needs to be revised? look at the astronomy and geology of things. the process at work, the flow that moves through things. the history of the world is a history of ghosts: people, traces, remnants scattered, dispersed into geological & historical time. the world is in constant flow. why fighting that? is a doomed planet in the distant future that unpalatable?

oh, but that's far away.

our task is the present. our deeds belong in this instantg, our future is NOW, this dharma. this defective, but always perfectible world.

our battle is in this generation!

i am closing this post next wednesday 11pm.