I. CARTESIAN DUALISM
1.
If the body can exist without the mind, then the mind and body must be two different substances.
FALSE
The conclusion does not follow simply from the premise.
Descartes' argument is stronger: if the mind and body have different essential properties—the mind is thinking and indivisible, while the body is extended and divisible—then they are different substances.
Merely saying that the body can exist without the mind does not by itself establish this.
Key point: Descartes argues for a distinction between mind and body based on their essential properties, not merely on the possibility of the body existing without the mind.
2.
If the mind is immaterial, then changes in the physical brain cannot affect what a person thinks or feels.
FALSE
Cartesian dualism holds that the mind and body are different substances, but they interact.
Therefore, physical changes in the brain can affect mental states. Likewise, mental states can affect the body.
Key point:
Mind ↔ Body
The difficulty for Cartesian dualism is precisely explaining how an immaterial substance can interact causally with a physical substance.
3.
According to Cartesian dualism, explaining everything that happens in the brain would completely explain everything that happens in the mind.
3. FALSE
According to Cartesian dualism, the mind is not identical to the brain. Therefore, a complete explanation of everything happening in the brain would not necessarily constitute a complete explanation of everything happening in the mind.
Key point:
Brain ≠ Mind
Knowing everything about the physical body does not exhaust what there is to know about the thinking substance.
II. LOGICAL BEHAVIORISM
4.
If a person has all the behavioral dispositions associated with being in pain, then that person must be in pain.
TRUE — according to logical behaviorism
Logical behaviorism identifies mental states with behavioral states or dispositions. Therefore, if someone possesses all the appropriate behavioral dispositions associated with pain, the theory treats that as sufficient for being in pain.
Key point:
MS = BS
However, the Perfect Pretender is designed to challenge precisely this claim: someone can display the appropriate behavior without actually experiencing pain.
5.
A person who feels pain but successfully suppresses every outward expression of pain is not in pain.
FALSE
This is the Spartan counterexample. A person could feel pain while successfully suppressing all outward pain behavior.
Therefore, according to the criticism of logical behaviorism, behavior is not necessary for the corresponding mental state.
Key point:
You can have the mental state without displaying the behavior.
6.
According to logical behaviorism, two people who are behaviorally identical must be in the same mental state.
TRUE — according to logical behaviorism
If mental states are reducible to behavioral states/dispositions, then two people with exactly the same relevant behavioral dispositions should be in the same mental state.
The problem is that the Perfect Pretender suggests that identical behavior does not guarantee identical mental experience.
III. IDENTITY THEORY
7.
If two people are in the same mental state, they must be in exactly the same brain state.
TRUE — according to the basic identity theory
If a particular mental state is a particular brain state, then two people who are in exactly the same mental state should have the corresponding brain state.
Key point:
MS = BrS
However, this creates complications when we consider creatures with very different physical constitutions that nevertheless seem capable of having the same mental states.
8.
If scientists knew every physical fact about a person's brain, they would therefore know exactly what that person's experiences feel like from the inside.
TRUE — according to a strong version of identity theory; FALSE as a philosophical consequence challenged by Nagel
This is one of the more interesting questions.
If mental states are identical to brain states, then in principle complete knowledge of the relevant brain states should give us complete knowledge of the mental state.
Nagel's bat challenges this assumption. Knowing every physical fact about a bat does not seem to tell us what it is like to be a bat.
Key distinction:
Knowing what happens physically ≠ knowing what the experience feels like from the first-person perspective.
9.
If a creature can experience pain without having a human brain or human neurophysiology, then human pain cannot simply be identical to a particular human brain state.
TRUE
This is the point of Lewis's Martian.
If the Martian can experience pain while lacking the human neurophysiological state normally associated with pain, then pain cannot simply be identical to that particular human brain state.
Key point: the human brain state may not be necessary for pain.
This is one reason functionalism becomes attractive: perhaps what matters is not the particular physical material but the causal role performed by the state.
IV. FUNCTIONALISM
10.
If two different physical systems perform exactly the same causal function, they can be in the same mental state.
TRUE
This is one of the central claims of functionalism.
Two physically different systems can be in the same mental state if they occupy the same relevant causal/functional role.
For example, a human brain and a sufficiently sophisticated artificial system might, in principle, instantiate the same functional organization.
Key point:
Different physical structures → same function → potentially same mental state
11.
If two people perform the same behavior, they must have the same mental state.
FALSE
Functionalism does not identify mental states simply with behavior.
Two people can produce the same behavior while having different internal functional states.
For example, someone might say "I'm fine" because they genuinely feel fine, while another person says exactly the same thing while feeling miserable.
Key point:
Same behavior ≠ necessarily the same mental state.
12.
If two people have the same mental state, they must produce exactly the same behavioral response.
FALSE
Functionalism does not claim that a particular mental state must always produce exactly the same behavioral response.
The same mental state can participate in different causal sequences depending on the person's other mental states, beliefs, desires, circumstances, etc.
This is essentially the lesson of the Mad Man case.
Key point:
Same mental state ≠ necessarily same behavioral output.
V. EPIPHENOMENALISM
13.
If mental states are caused by physical processes but never cause physical processes, then the mind is causally ineffective.
TRUE
That is essentially the definition of epiphenomenalism.
Physical processes cause mental states, but mental states have no causal influence on physical processes.
Key causal structure:
Physical → Mental
but not:
Mental → Physical
Therefore, mental states are causally ineffective with respect to the physical world.
14.
According to epiphenomenalism, your brain can cause you to experience pain, but your experience of pain cannot cause your brain to react.
TRUE
This is a straightforward statement of epiphenomenalism.
Your brain can produce the experience of pain, but the experience of pain itself does not cause the brain to react.
The brain's physical processes do the causal work.
Key point:
The experience of pain is an effect, not a physical cause.
15.
If a person says, "I am in pain," and the statement is caused by the person's experience of pain, then epiphenomenalism is false.
FALSE
The statement does not necessarily refute epiphenomenalism.
An epiphenomenalist can say that both the experience of pain and the verbal report "I am in pain" are caused by underlying physical/brain processes.
So:
Physical brain process → experience of pain, and independently: Physical brain process → verbal report "I am in pain"
The experience itself does not have to cause the report.
This is one of the major problems for epiphenomenalism: it has to explain why our reports about our conscious experiences appear to be caused by those experiences.
VI. MENTAL IRREDUCIBILITY / PRIMITIVE PROPERTIES
16.
If mental states cannot be completely described in behavioral, physical, or functional terms, then they must possess some irreducible property.
TRUE
If mental states cannot be completely reduced to behavioral, physical, or functional descriptions, then they possess some property that is irreducibly mental.
This is the basic idea of a primitive property.
Key point:
Mental ≠ merely behavioral
Mental ≠ merely brain state
Mental ≠ merely functional
17.
If mental states emerge from physical processes, then mental states must be identical to physical states.
FALSE
Emergence does not entail identity.
Something can emerge from a physical system without being identical to one of its physical states.
For example, according to this position, mental properties emerge from physical processes but have their own distinctive properties.
Key distinction:
Emerges from ≠ is identical to
18.
A mental state can be causally related to physical processes without being reducible to a physical state.
TRUE
This is precisely the possibility defended by the position of mental irreducibility.
A mental state can be causally connected with physical processes while still not being reducible to a physical state.
The important distinction is between causal dependence and identity.
Example: Feeling pain. You touch a hot stove. The heat activates pain receptors in your skin, which send signals to your brain. You experience pain and immediately pull your hand away.
According to mental irreducibility, the pain is causally connected to physical processes in your nervous system, but it is not identical to those processes. The neural activity explains how the pain is produced, but the subjective experience—what the pain feels like to you—cannot be reduced entirely to a description of neural activity.
Key point:
Mental state → causally related to physical processes does not necessarily mean
Mental state = physical state
BONUS — CROSS-THEORY QUESTIONS
19.
The Perfect Pretender is a problem for both logical behaviorism and identity theory for exactly the same reason.
FALSE
The Perfect Pretender is primarily a problem for logical behaviorism, because it challenges the idea that having the appropriate behavior or behavioral dispositions is sufficient for having the corresponding mental state.
It does not directly challenge identity theory in the same way.
Identity theory identifies mental states with brain states, not with behavior.
Key distinction:
Behaviorism: Mind = Behavior
Identity Theory: Mind = Brain State
Therefore, the two theories face different problems
20.
Nagel's bat challenges the claim that knowing everything physical about an organism is sufficient for knowing everything about its mental life.
TRUE
Nagel's bat challenges the claim that complete physical knowledge gives us complete knowledge of conscious experience.
We might know everything about a bat's physiology, nervous system, brain, and sonar system and still not know what it is like to be that bat.
This introduces the distinction between: third-person/objective knowledge, and first-person/subjective experience.
21.
Lewis's Martian shows that having a human brain is not necessary for experiencing pain.
TRUE
Lewis's Martian is designed to show that having a human brain is not necessary for experiencing pain.
The Martian has a radically different physical constitution but nevertheless experiences pain.
Therefore, pain cannot simply be identified with the particular human neurophysiological mechanism normally associated with it.
22.
The Inverted Spectrum challenges the claim that two systems with the same functional organization must have exactly the same conscious experience.
TRUE
The Inverted Spectrum challenges functionalism by suggesting that two people could have the same functional organization while having different qualitative experiences. Remember my interpretation of the experiment: you and a young woman both stop at the red light. You don’t know she has an inverted spectrum problem (she’s not looking at a red light, because red for her is green).
Key distinction:
Same function ≠ necessarily same qualitative experience.
23.
If mental states are irreducible, then Cartesian dualism must be true.
FALSE
Irreducibility does not entail Cartesian dualism.
A theory can claim that mental properties are irreducible without claiming that the mind is an immaterial substance.
This is precisely the distinction between:
Cartesian Dualism:
Mind is a separate immaterial substance.
versus
Mental Irreducibility:
Mental properties are irreducible, but they may still emerge from physical processes.
Irreducible ≠ immaterial substance.
24.
If mental states are caused by physical processes, then mental states cannot themselves have causal powers.
FALSE
The conclusion does not follow.
A mental state can be caused by physical processes and nevertheless have causal powers of its own.
This is precisely the position of mental irreducibility/emergentism.
Compare:
Physical → Mental
does not logically imply:
Mental → nothing
The possibility of mental causation is compatible with the idea that mental states depend upon physical processes while remaining irreducible to them.
