Q-memory helps the idea of a memory, in the strong sense, as too interconnected with the notion of selfhood to be of any constitutional value in terms of personal identity. If we can theoretically strip memory of this reliance on a specific self then we would avoid the inherently circular relationship between memory and personal identity. If this can be achieved then there is the possibility that we could get away with using this weaker version of memory as the sole criterion for personal identity. In order to do this Shoemaker tries to make a distinction between two different types of memory

Quasi-Memory, would seem to be void of any reference to a specific self. The reason why this is so is because by weakening the previous awareness condition Shoemaker strips memory of its ability to be immune from error through mis-identification in relation to the first person. Because of the fact that the memory can only belong to someone or other it cannot be said with certainty that the person who has the quasi-memory was aware of the event contained in the quasi-memory at the time of it’s occurrence, and thus we may well be mistaken in saying that the holder of the quasi-memory is the person who had the original quasi-memory in the first instance.