Topics for Review Exam #2 (Fall 2018)

Chapter 2 

Epiphenomenalism: the mind is an ineffective byproduct of physical processes. (The brain affects the mind, but the mind doesn't affect the brain)

Problem of other minds: It is the philosophical problem of explaining how it is possible to know that there are other minds in the world.

Section 2.1 

CARTESIAN DUALISM (Rene Descartes) The mind is an thinking, immaterial substance that interacts with the body. Counter to Cartesian Dualism: From the standpoint of Physics there is no immaterial substance. Thus, Cartesian theory as it stands is not viable. Dualists make a category mistake in assuming that minds exist in the same way that bodies do.

Section 2.2

Logical Behaviorism: MS ↔ BS (Mental S are Behavioral S) and Behavioral States are Behavioral Dispositions. So mental states are reducible to behavioral dispositions.

HOWEVER... A behavioral state is not sufficient OR necessary for being in a mental state. How do we know that?

Counterexamples to Logical Behaviorism: [Thought experiment: The Perfect Pretender] ● A person was born without the ability to feel pain ● He has learned to exhibit the appropriate pain behavior in appropriate situations. ● If someone kicks him, he pretends that it hurts him (he acts/behaves like someone who is in pain). According to this counterexample: Having the right behavioral dispositions does NOT GUARANTEE (not sufficient) that someone is in a certain mental state. 

[Thought experiment: Putnam’s Super-Spartans ] ● There is a community in which the adults have the ability to successfully suppress all involuntary pain behavior. ● The are able to feel pain and they dislike it just like we do. This thought experiment undermines logical behaviorism because the theory would have us believe that the Spartans are never in pain because they never ACT as if they are in pain. This is obviously not true. So, mental states are not reducible to behavioral states.  _______________________  

Identity Theory: MS ↔ BrS (mental states are brain states) It is simpler, better than Cartesian dualism because it doesn’t assume the existence of an immaterial substance. There is no need to go beyond the physical to explain the mental. Our behavior is caused by the brain, NOT the mind. Many Identity theorists are epiphenomenalists, e.g., the mind is to the brain as smoke is to fire.

HOWEVER… Knowing a person’s brain components, does NOT mean you know what the person is thinking/feeling.

Counterexamples to Identity Theory: [Thought Experiment Nagel’s bat ] ● This thought experiment explains how bats use sonar as a form of perception. Nagel shows that there’s no way that we can experience or imagine this form of perception. ● Facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism are only accessible from one's point of view, which is the organism itself (1st person). ● All of the physical properties of bats can be known by non-bats, BUT, no non-bat will ever know what it's like to be a bat. If mental states were identical to brain states, then it would be possible to know everything about the mind by knowing everything there is to know about the brain. BUT THIS IS NOT THE CASE. 

What do we learn from "Nagel's bats"? Mental states have Nagel's properties: 1- private, 2. subjective. They are felt from the inside, while physical properties can all be known from the "outside" from a third person point of view.

[Thought experiment: Lewis’s Pained Martian ] ● The Martian has no neurons or brain. ● But he can feel pain, love, sorrow, and homesickness. This thought experiment shows that having a brain is NOT NECESSARY for having a mind. So, mental states are not reducible to brain states (or synaptic activity).

Section 2.3 

Functionalism: MS ↔ FS When two things perform the same function, they are said to have the same “causal role.” So functionalism claims that the mind IS what the brain DOES. If a robot and a human can perform the same task (same causal role), they are said to be in the same state of mind. Something else about functionalism is that mental states can cause other mental states: remember my example of seeing my girlfriend cheating (input) with these mental states (outputs): 1- shock, 2- jealousy, 3- bitterness, 4- vengeance.

Counterexamples to Functionalism: [Lewis’s pained madman ] ● Lewis’s madman is in pain, but his pain has a very different function than ours. ● When in pain, his mind turns into calculue and makes him cross his legs and snap his fingers. This undermines functionalism because if the theory were true, it would be impossible for someone to be in pain and function differently than we do when we are in pain. Being in a certain functional state is NOT a necessary condition for being in a mental state. Mental states cannot be reduced to functional states. 

[Putnam’s inverted spectrum ] ● Two people with inverted spectra are in the same functional state. ● If you asked them, “What color are stop signs?” they would both say, “Red.” Similarly, if you asked them, “Are ripe tomatoes the same color as stop signs?” they would both say, “Yes.” ● BUT their visual experiences (qualitative content - the feel) are vastly different -- one experiences redness when looking at red objects, whereas the other experiences blueness. If functionalism were true, it would be impossible for people with the same functional organization to be in different mental states. This counterexample undermines functionalism. So, mental states are not reducible to functional states.  
 

TURING TEST FOR INTELLIGENCE: (The imitation game). There is a man (A) and a woman (B) and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. ↔ The object of the game is for the interrogator to determine which of the two is the man and which is the woman. ↔ It is A’s object in the game to try to cause C to make the wrong identification. The object for the game of B is to help the interrogator.

For Turing there’s nothing more to being intelligent than being able to use language as we do. WHICH MEANS… If a computer is able to do this, then it is smart. 
 
Section 2.5 

Let's have these concepts ready: Intentionality ↔ Bedeutung. It is the “ABOUTNESS” of a thought. Without intentionality our life would be completely mechanical. Primitive property → The qualia (the FEEL) and the intentional content (the OBJECT) of a mental state are not reducible to physical or functional properties. They are “primitive” properties. How do we know? Because qualia cannot be explained in terms of anything more fundamental. Ex. "My first kiss." Bedeutung directly intends the object. We don’t think about objects by means of anything else. We simply think ABOUT them.

Emergent property → A property which is elicited when things that lack that property interact in certain ways. The WHOLE is bigger than the PARTS: The emergent property arises when all parts are put together. ● The mind is emergent upon and caused by brain activity. EX: Love at first sight. ● Life is an emergent property. ● HURRICANES (wind-rain-destruction) ← ALL of these variables MUST happen in order for the emergent property to arise.

click here for examples of emergent properties,

Downward causation → Downward causation is used to explain the effect of the environment on biological evolution. It suggests the causal relationship between the HIGHER levels of a system to LOWER levels of that system. For example: mental events causes physical events. There is a two-way interaction between consciousness and the brain: Consciousness determines the succession of nerve impulses, and nerve impulses determine the content of consciousness.

click here for the systemic model of the brain we discussed in class,

This is the MIND model I recommend. Searle's systemic theory is better than Property Dualism because it avoids having to accept that non-physical things can cause physical things. Here everything is physical and yet complex enough so that the mind still downward causes the brain. The mind is still irreducible to physical states, because it is an emergent property of physical states, only immensely more complex. 

Chapter 3

Section 3.1 

Causal Determinism: (every event has a cause that makes it happen + laws of nature). Now the atomists extend the causal determinist argument to include us, humans. Why? Because we're made up of atoms. We are walking super-aggregations of atoms.

If so, we could say that If Causal Determinism is true, then there is no free will (the will is not free because it's all atoms swerving inside us). We are subject to the same lawes of causation than atoms are. This is know as Hard determinism.

Hard Determinism: the doctrine that there are no free actions. Now we have two consequences: If there are no free actions, then there is no human responsibility: (since one is responsible if and only if one can make choices).

Section 3.2 

Compatibilism: Determined actions can nevertheless be free.

Traditional Compatibilism: (Free actions are 1- caused by one's will and 2- not externally constrained). The reasoning is this: How could actions be simultaneously predetermined and free? Traditional compatibilists explain this apparent contradiction with the principle of alternative possibilities.

Principle of alternative possibilities: one can be held responsible for doing something only if one could have done otherwise. "could have done otherwise" means "if you had chosen otherwise, then you would have done otherwise." Think of our "fork-example" of a student being late for class. He chooses ( A) "having coffee with lots of traffic," instead of (B) "not having coffee and no traffic." For Traditional Compatibilism the student is responsible for being late since "if he had choosen (B) instead of (A), he would have been on time for class. So how does compatibilists treat the crime problem? Punishment: How do compatibilists see punishment? p. 203. Punishment cannot be retributive (eye-for-an-eye). The only legitimate way of punishment is rehabilitation and deterrence. Criminal actions are dictated by genes and habits (nature and nurture). Retributive punishment makes sense if it's deserved. But nothing people do is up to them.

Section 3.3 

Libertarianism: Event and Agent Causation. Event---> event or Agent---> event. Libertarianism: agents can cause events, e.g., free actions are caused by selves. How? remember we concluded in 2.5. that the mind causes the brain.

Libertarians don't believe an action is free if it's caused by someone else's desires. Example: if a person is being brain-washed into committing a crime, the Libertarian definitely would consider that a minimizing factor in the individual's culpability. There are two arguments in favor of

 Argument from Experience: Basically, we experience ourselves choosing.

Argument from deliberation: We feel ourselves deliberating.

Libet's Neurophysiological challenge: it seems to show that consciousness of a decision arises only after the decision has already been made (the 300 millisecond gap between the decision to press the button and the brain signal). 

Rebuttal by Libertarians: There's a difference between making a "conscious decision" and a "meta-conscious decision" (meta-conscious awareness is second order). For the libertarian, the subject in Libet's report is not having a "conscious" but a "meta-conscious" decision. So it's no surprise that it happens "after" the conscious decision was made.