chapter 4: philosophy of mind (all sections)

4.1 Mind/Body problem

(you should know all the definition boxes in section 2.1)

Descartes believes the mind = res cogitans (non-physical substance)
body =  res extensa (matter has extension)

1- according to Descartes, the mind is a thinking, non-physical substance.
proof: conceivability argument: "I can conceive that I exist without a body"
divisibility argument: If the body and the mind were the same, what I say of the mind I can say of the body (Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals), but mind and body are different, one is extended the other is not, one can be divided, the other not. so, mind & body are different.
  

therefore: mental states (MS) are non-physical.

2- The hypothesis that the mind and the body are completely different is called cartesian dualism.

3- how does the mind interact with the body? Descartes believes through a interactive process that passes through the pineal gland (clearly this explanation is flawed, given today's advancements in neurophysiology).

Counter to Descartes & the principle of closure of the physical
4- a physical effect can only have a physical cause, this is known as the principle of closure of the physical. clearly, since cartesian dualism violates this, many conclude that the mind (if it exists at all) must be epiphenomenal, e.g., the body affects the mind, but the mind doesn't affect the body).

5- the problem of other minds.
both epiphenomenalism and cartesianism are face the problem of other minds. the mind is experienced directly, but there's no way of telling from the outside whether one has a mind or not. you cannot experience anybody else's mind.

the importance of descartes' argument is that he provides a deductive argument for the mind as non-physical thinking substance that is valid (though not sound). 

(physicalist theories, MIND DISAPPEARS)

Logical behaviorism: (the mind as behavior)  is the theory that mental states are behavioral dispositions.

a behavioral disposition (behavioral states) is a tendency to respond to certain stimuli in certain ways.

ex: smoking. how is "smoking" a behavioral disposition? a person is in contact with smokers environments (parents, friends providing the stimuli, etc). the behavior is repeated (without the repetition we don't get the disposition), once the behavior becomes automatic we have a disposition, i.e., the person smokes given the right conditions.    

behaviorism is an important measure understanding habits, human actions, freedom and responsibility, it's essential in the analysis of character.

so, MS --> BhS 

counters to logical behaviorism: The Perfect Pretender & and Putnam's Superspartans (you should know these).

problem with logical behaviorism is that it defines

summary: logical behaviorism is a materialistic theory. it doesn't postulate immaterial entities. it's also reductive because any statement about minds can be reduced to statements about behavior.

Identity theory: (the mind as a brain) mental states are brain states MS --> BrS

summary: the idea now is that any discussion about the mind is really a discussion about the brain. identity theory seems a better theory than behaviorism because it's closer to the source which causes mental states.

counters to identity theory: Nagel's Bat and Lewis' Pained Martian (you have to know these).

see that from Nagel's Bats thought experiment we learn two important features of the mind: it's 1- subjective and 2-private. so, the fact that we feel our minds from the inside is actually points to a quality (qualia).

another problem for identity theory is multiple realizability:  the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states, or events. in other words, a supercomputer, an alien, can have a mind (think of a property that must be able to be instantiated by different realizers and different mechanisms: for example: the classic spring mousetrap and the glue mousetrap instantiate the same property, the ability to trap mice, but they do so through different mechanisms).  

summary: brains states can be known by empirical investigation, not so with mental states. 
identity theory is a reductive theory because any talk about mental states means talking about brain activity. 

Functionalism: (the mind as a program) mental states are functional states. MS --> FS

for functionalism the mind is what the brain does. and it allows mental states to serve both as input and output of other mental states. example: suppose you believe your boyfriend is cheating on you, now your mind causes you to become jealous. so, mental states don't only cause behaviors, in addition, they also cause other mental states.  

counters to functionalism: Lewis' Pained Madman and Putnam's Inverted Spectrum.