chapter 4 homework

1. Why does Descartes believe that the mind is different from the body?

2. What is Logical Behaviorism? how can you refute this formula MS-->BS? Explain.

3. Why is Psychology a soft science? Explain.

4. What is Identity theory? Is Identity Theory is better than Logical Behaviorism? Explain.

5. What is qualia? Why do we call qualia a first-person report? 

5. What is Nagel's BAT thought experiment? What does it prove?

6. What is Functionalism? 

7. What is Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment? 

8. After going through questions 1-5 regarding the mind, what can we say about mental states?

9. So, finally what is the mind according to the systemic model of the brain?

ALL YOUR ANSWERS ARE DOWN HERE LOOK FOR THEM!!!

chapter 4

Epiphenomenalism: the mind is an ineffective byproduct of physical processes. (The brain affects the mind, but the mind doesn't affect the brain)

Problem of other minds: It is the philosophical problem of explaining how it is possible to know that there are other minds in the world.

 CARTESIAN DUALISM (Rene Descartes) The mind is an immaterial thinking substance that interacts with the body. Decartes uses a deductive argument to prove it, 1. "I can conceive I exist without a body", 2. "the body is divisible, the mind is not," therefore: "mind and body are different."

Logical Behaviorism: MS ↔ BS (Mental states are Behavioral states) and Behavioral States are Behavioral Dispositions (the ability to respond to certain stimulus) . So mental states are reducible to behavioral dispositions.

HOWEVER... A behavioral state is not sufficient OR necessary for being in a mental state. How do we know that?

FAKING BEHAVIOR/ Counterexamples to Logical Behaviorism: The Pretender Thought Experiment ● A who is born without the ability to feel pain lears to exhibit the appropriate pain behavior in appropriate situations. ● If someone kicks him, he pretends that it hurts him (he acts/behaves like someone who is in pain). According to this counterexample: Having the right behavioral dispositions does NOT GUARANTEE (not sufficient) that someone is in a certain mental state. 

[Putnam's Spartan Thought Experiment ] ● the spartan has the ability to suppress all involuntary pain behavior though  they feel pain and they dislike it just like we do. this thought experiment undermines logical behaviorism because the theory would have us believe that the Spartans are never in pain because they never ACT as if they are in pain. This is obviously not true. So, mental states are not reducible to behavioral states. 

Identity Theory: MS ↔ BrS (mental states are brain states) It is simpler, better than Cartesian dualism because it doesn’t assume the existence of an immaterial substance. There is no need to go beyond the physical to explain the mental. Our behavior is caused by the brain, NOT the mind. Identity Theory is better than Logical Behaviorism because (being the study of the brain) it's closer to the source of the mind. 

Many Identity theorists are epiphenomenalists, e.g., the mind is to the brain as smoke is to fire.

HOWEVER… Knowing a person’s brain does NOT imply knowing what the person is thinking/feeling.

Counterexamples to Identity Theory: [Thomas Nagel’s Bat Experiment ] ● We know how bats use sonar as a form of perception. Nagel shows that there’s no way that we can experience or imagine this form of perception. ● WHY NOT? Because facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism are only accessible from one's point of view, which is the organism itself (1st person). ● All of the physical properties of bats can be known by non-bats, BUT, no non-bat will ever know what it's like to be a bat. If mental states were identical to brain states, then it would be possible to know everything about the mind by knowing everything there is to know about the brain. BUT THIS IS NOT THE CASE. 

So, mental states exhibit Nagel's properties: 1- private (1st-person reports), 2. subjective. They are felt from the inside. Physical properties are 1- public (third person point of view), 2- objective.

Functionalism: MS ↔ FS When two things perform the same function, they are said to have the same “causal role.” Functionalism claims that THE MIND IS WHAT THE BRAIN DOES.

If a robot and a human can perform the same task (same causal role), they are said to be in the same state of mind. Something else about functionalism is that mental states can cause other mental states, i.e., if you see your boyfriend cheating with another woman (input), the following mental states occur (outputs): 1- shock, 2- jealousy, 3- bitterness, (even vengeance).

Counterexamples to Functionalism:  [Putnam's Inverted Spectrum Thought Experiment] ● Imagine an individual is born with an inverted color spectrum. What is red she sees green and vice-versa. ● Then she learns how to tell the difference. She grows up and gets her driver's license. If you asked her: “What color is the top light of the traffic light? She would say RED (she sees it GREEN). ● Her visual experience (the qualitative content - the feel IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE REST OF US). This proves that not every time we are in a functional state (STOPPING AT A RED LIGHT) we are in the same MENTAL STATE.  

Lewis' Mad Man Thought Experiment: A person feels a headache (input) but instead of going "ouch" (output, function of pain) he studies calculus. Here he's in the same mental state normal people are, but in a different functional state. This proves one can be in a mental state and not in the same functional state.

TURING TEST FOR INTELLIGENCE: Imitation game. There is a man (A) and a woman (B) and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. → The object of the game is for the interrogator to determine which of the two is the man and which is the woman. → It is A’s object in the game to try to cause C to make the wrong identification. The object for the game of B is to help the interrogator.
For Turing there’s nothing more to being intelligent than being able to use language as we do. WHICH MEANS… If a computer is able to do this, then it is smart.

WHAT DO WE LEARN? MENTAL STATES ARE NOT REDUCIBLE TO BEHAVIORAL STATES, TO BRAIN STATES, TO FUNCTIONAL STATES. MENTAL STATES ARE IRREDUCIBLE. WE CALL PROPERTY OF MENTAL STATES A PRIMITIVE PROPERTY.
 
INTENTIONALITY IS A PRIMITIVE PROPERTY, it's the “ABOUTNESS” of a thought. Without intentionality our life would be completely mechanical. A SYNONYM FOR INTENTIONALITY IS QUALIA, i.e., THE UNIQUE PRIVATE SUBJECTIVE "FEEL" OF YOUR MENTAL STATE. 

NOW COMES MY ANALISYS OF THE MIND AS SYSTEMIC PROPERTY OF THE BRAIN. 

this is a sketch of a systemic model for the mind (going up emergence, going down supervinience)

emergent property → is a property which is caused by things that lack that property & interact in certain ways. IN SISTEMS THE WHOLE IS BIGGER THAN THE PARTS. The emergent property arises when all parts are put together. ● The mind is emergent upon and caused by brain activity. EX: Love at first sight. ● Life is an emergent property. ● HURRICANES (wind-rain-destruction) ← ALL of these variables MUST happen in order for the emergent property to arise.

click here for examples of emergent properties,

Downward causation → Downward causation is used to explain the effect of the environment on biological evolution. It suggests the causal relationship between the HIGHER levels of a system to LOWER levels of that system. For example: mental events causes physical events. There is a two-way interaction between consciousness and the brain: Consciousness determines the succession of nerve impulses, and nerve impulses determine the content of consciousness.

click here for a better understanding of the brain-systemic-model for the mind,